Influenza A viruses are single-stranded, negativesense, enveloped RNA viruses, possessing eight gene segments that encode 11 known proteins (Refs 1, 2). The two major surface glycoproteins haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) form the basis of serologically distinct virus subtypes. There are currently 16 HA and nine NA subtypes identified; all subtypes are found in wild waterbirds, the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses (Refs 2, 3). Despite this extensive diversity, only select subtypes have breached the species barrier, and, to date, viruses bearing H1, H2, H3, H5, H7 or H9 have caused documented human infections (Refs 2, 4, 5). The generation of a pandemic requires the emergence of a virus in the human population that (1) bears an HA to which there is little or no pre-existing immunity, (2) causes disease in humans, and (3) is capable of sustained humanto-human transmission (Fig. 1) . However, only three subtypes (H1-H3) have acquired all three of these properties to cause pandemics in the last 100 years -in 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), 1968 (H3N2) and 2009 (H1N1). In the relatively rare transmission of avian viruses to humans, primarily through contact with infected domestic poultry, H5, H7 and H9 subtypes have failed to establish a foothold in human populations. Therefore, understanding the ability of a virus to achieve a transmissible phenotype is an essential component in assessing the pandemic potential of novel subtypes. In this review, we highlight the complexities inherent in the study of influenza virus transmissibility, how the use of mammalian models and reverse genetics has facilitated a more detailed examination of the molecular determinants that govern virus transmission, and the clinical implications of this knowledge.
Assessment of influenza A virus transmissibility
The ability of influenza viruses to spread through susceptible populations to cause annual epidemics and occasional pandemics is well documented. When modelling influenza virus transmission in a laboratory setting, accurately defining the route of transmission under investigation is crucial. Influenza viruses spread either by inhalation of virus-containing respiratory droplets or droplet nuclei expelled from an infected person during breathing, coughing, sneezing or talking, or by direct or indirect contact with virus-containing fomites on environmental surfaces (Refs 6, 7, 8) . The use of mammalian models has enabled detailed study of influenza virus transmission by both contact and respiratory droplet routes.
Transmissibility of human and avian influenza A viruses
Historical records suggest frequent appearances of a highly contagious, acute respiratory illness infecting humans since ancient times, with an aetiology consistent with present-day influenza epidemics (Ref. 9) . The efficient transmissibility of seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses is well known; the contagious nature of influenza has been documented by epidemiological studies from outbreaks occurring among diverse populations and locations, including cruise ships, school dormitories, hospitals and nursing homes ( Refs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14) . The presence of a single ill individual in a confined space, such as an airplane, was sufficient for an outbreak to occur among previously healthy passengers (Refs 15, 16) . Analysis of global airline flight itineraries at the onset of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic found a strong correlation between international movement of travellers and countries with confirmed influenza infections, further illustrating the capacity for rapid spread of infectious disease in a highly mobile global population (Ref. 17) . The rates of influenza virus infections are highest during pandemics, when little to no pre-existing immunity to the virus exists among susceptible populations, although attack and case-fatality rates vary from pandemic to pandemic (Ref. 18 ). Nevertheless, once pandemic viruses become established in humans, their efficient seasonal spread among otherwise healthy individuals ultimately provides an ongoing and even greater public health burden in terms of hospitalisations and lives lost. Serious illness and death following seasonal influenza virus infection in the USA occurs predominantly among the elderly, resulting in an average of 36 000 deaths each year (Ref. 19 ). As such, influenza viruses present not only an occasional pandemic threat but also an ongoing annual threat to public health worldwide. Unlike human influenza viruses, wholly avian low-pathogenic influenza viruses do not generally replicate to high titres in humans and have not been demonstrated to readily transmit between people (Refs 20, 21). However, sporadic human infections with avian influenza viruses of the H5, H7 and H9 subtypes have occurred, frequently following exposure to infected poultry ( Refs 4, 5, 22) . Probable human-tohuman transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 and H7N7 subtypes has been reported rarely (Refs 23, 24, 25, 26) . Although these avian influenza viruses have not demonstrated the capacity for sustained transmission in a human population, continual evolution of these viruses in avian species calls for close surveillance of land-based poultry and individuals exposed to potentially infected birds for the emergence of a novel strain that might possess or readily acquire this ability. Transmission of influenza viruses between avian species, and transmission and subsequent establishment of influenza virus lineages in other mammals (including swine, equine and canine species), are a threat to public health but fall outside the scope of this review. 
Modes of influenza virus transmission

Host barrier
• Acquisition of humanadapted surface proteins or mutation of avian HA to enhance a2-6-binding ability
• Key mutations in PB2 confer enhanced replicative ability at human URT temperatures
• Heightened replication and inflammation in the upper respiratory tract
Potential virological solution
Assessing the pandemic potential of influenza viruses Expert Reviews in Molecular Medicine © Cambridge University Press 2010 Figure 1 . Assessing the pandemic potential of influenza viruses. Of the three properties an influenza virus must possess to cause a pandemic (blue boxes), avian influenza viruses currently meet two (red boxes). Several barriers have been proposed to contribute to the poor transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in humans (green box), but the potential for these viruses to overcome these barriers maintains their status as a pandemic threat (amber box 
Mammalian models of influenza virus transmission
The ferret has been used to model influenza infection since it was first used to isolate the virus in the 1930s. Ferrets are naturally susceptible to influenza viruses and exhibit many clinical signs following infection (such as sneezing, fever and nasal discharge) that are comparable to influenza-like illness in humans (Refs 34, 35) . Furthermore, the respiratory tract of ferrets appears to closely resemble that of humans, because avian H5N1 and human H3N2 influenza viruses display similar patterns of virus attachment to respiratory tissues of both species (Refs 36, 37). The utility of ferrets to assess the transmissibility of influenza viruses was described as early as 1941 in a study by Andrewes and Glover, who found that susceptible naive ferrets housed in the same room as ferrets shedding virus became infected, even when physical barriers that would trap and prevent the dissemination of large droplets were used (Ref. 38 ). The ferret model has in recent years become the model of choice for most influenza virus research and is routinely used to examine the transmissibility of both human and avian influenza viruses by either direct contact or respiratory droplets ( Refs 39, 40, 41, 42, 43) . The high susceptibility of ferrets to influenza virus infection can make it difficult to obtain ferrets that are seronegative against currently circulating influenza viruses for research purposes; despite this, the use of seronegative ferrets is essential both for experiment reproducibility and to best assess the inherent pathogenicity and transmissibility of a given virus following primary infection. However, it must be recognised that understanding these properties in a naive animal model might not fully address the more complex real-world situation of influenza infection in human populations, which possess varying degrees of adaptive immunity to circulating strains.
Like ferrets, guinea pigs are susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses without prior adaptation, and the utility of this model for transmission studies has recently been examined ( Refs 44, 45, 46) . Human influenza viruses transmit efficiently between guinea pigs by either direct contact or respiratory droplets (Refs 45, 47, 48) . However, unlike in ferrets, influenza disease in guinea pigs is not clinically apparent, and thus symptoms cannot be used to assess the progression of disease among inoculated or contact animals. Furthermore, the receptor distribution of the guinea pig airway is not yet fully characterised (Refs 49, 50). Nevertheless, the relatively small size and lower cost of guinea pigs make them an attractive model for some laboratories, especially when studying the contribution of environmental conditions to virus transmissibility (Ref. 51) .
Historically, mice have been the most widely used animal model for influenza virus research. Although inbred mice have been used extensively for the study of influenza virus pathogenicity, they are only infrequently used for a model of virus transmissibility. It has been hypothesised that influenza virus transmission in this model occurs primarily by airborne droplet nuclei, because comparable rates of transmission occur when infected and susceptible mice are either co-housed or separated by a barrier that allows for air exchange without direct or indirect contact between animals (Ref. 52). Transmission of mouse-adapted avian viruses in mice has also been reported in both transmission models (Ref. 53 ). However, a lack of consistency has been reported with this model, with a variability in results observed depending on parameters such as age of mice, virus strain tested, and route and dose of inoculum administered (Ref. 54 ). As such, the mouse model is not widely used to study influenza virus transmissibility. The nonhuman primate model has been used to study the virulence of select influenza viruses, but because of limited numbers, cost and ethical considerations this species is also not a routinely used model to study influenza virus transmissibility (Ref. 55 ). Considering that size influences the movement, condensation and evaporation of aerosolised droplets generated by infected individuals, identifying the range of particle sizes expelled during respiratory events and the size range of these particles containing infectious virus is crucial for understanding the contagiosity of viral respiratory diseases (Ref. 75) . For instance, variability in bioaerosol concentration and total volume in exhaled air during coughing and sneezing of children in a school setting was demonstrated by mathematical modelling to influence transmission dynamics (Ref. 76 ). Airway deposition, or the fraction of inhaled particles that are retained in the respiratory tract and not exhaled, varies greatly, depending on the individual's airway structure and physiology, breathing rate and volume, the size and composition of inhaled particles, and environmental conditions, such as airflow, temperature and humidity levels (Ref. 72) . Once deposited in the respiratory tract, the ability of the particular virus to attach, infect and replicate at the site of deposition also has a role. Given the complexity in defining these parameters, most in vivo transmission studies have been limited in defining 'respiratory droplets' as inclusive of both large and small droplets in the absence of direct or indirect contact (Ref. 40 ). However, with increased availability of aerosol generation, sampling and analytical instrumentation, more questions addressing the behaviour of aerosols in the environment and their impact on influenza virus transmission will likely be explored (Ref. 73 ).
Transmissibility of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus
Factors affecting influenza virus transmission
Weather conditions have been shown to further affect the persistence of aerosols in the environment and influence influenza virus transmission efficacy. It has been hypothesised that virus transmission occurs by the aerosol route in temperate climates and by the contact route in tropical zones, because research using the guinea pig model has shown that aerosol but not contact transmission is sensitive to these environmental conditions (Refs 77, 78 
Contribution of receptor binding and surface glycoproteins
The influenza virus HA binds to glycoconjugates containing terminal sialic acids (SAs) present on host cells throughout the respiratory tract epithelium prior to virus entry and replication. These SA receptors are predominantly found in two linkage conformations: Neu5Acα(2,6)-Gal (abbreviated as α2-6) and Neu5Acα 60, 61, 62) . In addition to differences in linkage conformation, the structural topology of sialylated glycans further influences the binding of influenza viruses to SA (Refs 92, 93).
Molecular studies on the HA of human H1-H3 influenza viruses have revealed specific amino acids situated in the receptor-binding domain that confer a preference for binding to α2-6-linked SA. For H3 viruses, the presence of a leucine at 226 and a serine at 228 in the HA protein results in α2-6-linked SA binding; glutamine and glycine are found at these positions in avian H3 viruses and confer a binding specificity for α2-3-linked SA (Ref. 84 ). The receptor-binding site of the H2 HA is similar to that of H3 viruses, with a crucial role identified for residue 226 in the acquisition of human-receptor-binding specificity (Refs 94, 95). Human H1 viruses preferentially bind α2-6-linked SA but possess both Gln226 and Gly228; other HA residues, including Ser186, Asp190 and Asp225, can confer this binding preference (Refs 84, 96). The alteration of two amino acids in the HA of the reconstructed 1918 virus (Glu190 and Gly225) was sufficient to switch the H1 HA to a preference for binding α2-3-linked SA and abolish respiratory droplet transmission of this virus in the ferret model (Ref. 41) (Fig. 2) . These results suggest that an important adaptation of an avian influenza virus to a mammalian host is to switch its preference for binding α2-3-linked SA.
To date, HPAI viruses of the H5 and H7 subtype have largely retained a binding specificity for α2-3-linked SA and have not demonstrated the capacity for efficient transmission through air by respiratory droplets in the ferret model (Refs 40, 43, 89, 90) . Even for the rare H5 or H7 wild-type virus that possesses dual binding to α2-3-and α2-6-linked SA, there was no change in the transmission phenotype (by respiratory droplets) in ferrets (Refs 40, 89, 97). However, a North American lineage H7N2 virus with an increased affinity for α2-6-linked SA showed efficient transmission by direct contact only in ferrets (Ref. 89). A mallard H7N3 virus able to replicate in human airway epithelial cultures in vitro was also capable of partial direct contact transmission in the ferret model, as was an H9N2 virus that possessed Leu226 in HA (Refs 98, 99) . Although the H7 and H9 viruses discussed here did not transmit efficiently through air by respiratory droplets, the capacity for increased direct contact transmission might be the initial step towards the ultimate hightransmissible phenotype of human seasonal influenza viruses. Continued monitoring of avian influenza viruses isolated from domestic birds and humans exposed to them will provide a greater understanding of the pandemic potential of these viruses.
Site-directed mutagenesis along with reverse genetics has been used in attempts to identify the molecular changes necessary for altered the binding specificity of avian influenza viruses and to understand the effect of enhanced binding to α2-6-linked SA on avian influenza virus transmissibility. Unlike H1 viruses, substitution of Asp190 or Asp225 in the HA of an H5N1 virus is not sufficient to confer increased affinity for α2-6-linked SA (Ref. 90 ). Mutation of residues 226 and 228, which modulate binding specificity among H3 and H2 viruses, resulted in decreased binding of an H5N1 virus to α2-3-linked SA but only modest increases in affinity for α2-6-linked SA (Ref. 90 ). Substitution of additional amino acids within the HA of H5N1 viruses, including Ser193, Ala137 and Ile192, resulted in decreased binding to α2-3-linked SA or increased binding to α2-6-linked SA (Refs 100, 101). Removal of a glycosylation site (Asn158) on the H5 HA yielded similar altered binding specificity among H5N1 viruses (Ref. 101) . Overall, these studies show that mutations that confer a binding preference for α2-6-linked SA among H1, H2 and H3 viruses are not sufficient to elicit comparable human binding specificity on an H5N1 virus framework. Nonetheless, the studies provide a greater understanding of the ability of H5 viruses to acquire specificity for human receptors. Whether a change in receptor-binding specificity alone is sufficient for an avian influenza virus to acquire the ability to transmit efficiently in humans is not fully known. However, in one study, recombinant H1N1 viruses were designed to test the premise that The use of avian-human reassortant viruses has broadened our understanding of how individual genes contribute towards the overall transmissibility of influenza viruses. Substitution of genes from a transmissible human influenza virus on the framework of a nontransmissible avian influenza virus has facilitated a more detailed examination of which genes are necessary to achieve a transmissible phenotype and have shown that virus transmissibility is a complex and polygenic trait. Avian-human reassortant viruses bearing surface proteins from human virus H3N2 but with the remaining genes from an avian H5N1 virus were not capable of transmitting by respiratory droplets in the ferret model (Refs 40, 103 ). An H5N1 virus with internal proteins encoded by humanvirus genes was similarly incapable of respiratory droplet transmission, demonstrating that the presence of human-virus surface proteins or human-virus internal proteins alone in an 'avian' virus is insufficient to achieve transmission through the air (Ref. 40) . A reassortant virus bearing surface proteins of an H9N2 virus with enhanced binding specificity for α2-6-linked SA on the framework of a human H3N2 virus was capable of direct contact transmission in ferrets; subsequent adaptation of this virus in ferrets resulted in a virus capable of transmission by respiratory droplets (Refs 99, 104). Taken together, these studies imply a crucial role for influenza virus surface glycoproteins in overall virus transmissibility, but suggest that additional virus genes are needed for efficient transmission.
Other viral molecular determinants affecting influenza virus transmission
Beyond HA and NA, additional viral proteins have been examined for their contributing roles in influenza virus transmission. Notably, the involvement of the influenza virus polymerase complex in virus transmissibility has been an area of active investigation. A reassortant virus bearing human influenza virus HA, NA and polymerase proteins on the framework of a nontransmissible avian influenza virus was capable of transmission by respiratory droplets in the ferret model (Ref. 103) . Although reassortant viruses bearing human influenza virus surface glycoproteins and PA, PB1 or PB2 human influenza virus polymerase were all capable of efficient replication in the ferret upper respiratory tract, only the virus containing the human-virus PB2 transmitted by respiratory droplets. The PB2 protein, and residue 627 in particular, has been of particular interest given its roles in determination of host range, virulence in mammalian models and virus replication efficiency (Refs 105, 106, 107) . A lysine at position 627 has been shown to enhance replication efficiency in vitro at 33°C, the temperature of the human upper respiratory tract, and viruses bearing Lys627 in PB2 replicate to higher titres in mammalian nasal passages (Refs 106, 108) . The presence of Lys627 Influenza virus infections that result in expulsion of increased amounts of respiratory fluids, by sneezing for example, might provide an increased opportunity for the transmission of virus to susceptible persons. A general correlation has been observed between viruses that predominantly bind α2-6-linked SA and the incidence of sneezing in infected ferrets (Refs 40, 103, 113) . Increased replication in the upper respiratory tract could result in heightened inflammation in the epithelial lining of nasal passages and, as a result, stimulate increased mucus production and sneezing, but this has not been experimentally shown. However, efficient transmission of human influenza viruses occurs in the guinea pig model in the absence of apparent sneezing (Ref. 45) . Clearly, further studies are needed, not only to identify additional molecular determinants of influenza viruses but also to better understand their influence in host responses to infection that might enhance the spread of virus among people.
Host determinants affecting influenza virus transmission
The major focus of studies that seek to better understand influenza virus pathogenesis and transmission is on the contribution of viral determinants affecting infectivity and disease severity. Little information is available regarding host genetic determinants that might contribute to susceptibility or resistance to influenza virus infection. Nevertheless, some studies point to a potential contribution of an individual's genetic background as a contributing factor to their risk of infection and severe disease when exposed to influenza virus. Epidemiological findings have identified several family clusters of HPAI H5N1 infections, with severe outcome of infection documented among blood relatives but not among nonblood relatives such as spouses (Refs 25, 114, 115, 116) . Concurrently, common hygiene practices among family members and similar exposure to contaminated environments might also have a role (Ref. 117) . A separate study investigated the risk of severe influenza infection among genealogically connected people in Utah over a 100-year period and found that close and distant relatives of individuals who died of influenza had a significantly higher risk of dying than their spousal counterparts, pointing to genetic predisposition rather than environmental similarities as the greater contributing factor (Ref. 118 ).
An individual's genetic makeup and immunological history undoubtedly influence the resulting immune response following virus infection and can have a strong effect on susceptibility to both infection and disease outcome. The role of immunological memory was clearly shown during the 1918 pandemic, because individuals possessing circulating HAspecific H1-virus crossreactive antibody showed enhanced survival compared with age groups likely to be serologically naive to the pandemic strain (Ref. 119) . In addition to the contribution of pre-existing immunity, the interaction of viral genes with the host immune system can influence disease severity. Patients infected with the 1918 influenza virus or HPAI H5N1 viruses have been linked to a dysregulation of the inflammatory response, a result affected by both viral and host genetic determinants ( Refs 120, 121, 122, 123) . Additional studies that focus on genetic factors that predispose people to increased risk of infection and severe disease caused by influenza viruses are needed; recent identification of candidate genes proposed to have a role in the genetic basis for influenza virus pathogenicity will facilitate this research (Ref. 124) . Because prospective human studies are usually expensive and logistically challenging, the evaluation of host genetic variations and responses to influenza virus infection has been primarily limited to the murine model (Ref. 125) . A recent study demonstrated substantial changes in HPAI H5N1 virus lethality among different strains of inbred mice, identifying a role for host genetic variation in influenza-virus-induced pathology in this model (Ref. 126) . As more information becomes available about genetic markers of susceptibility to influenza virus infection, we will be able to better identify at-risk groups and focus our efforts on implementing appropriate prevention and transmission control strategies.
Pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions and influenza virus transmission
It is evident that viral, host and environmental conditions all influence how effectively influenza A viruses spread among humans. Given this breadth of exposure variability, efforts to mitigate human-to-human transmission of influenza viruses are diverse and use both pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical strategies. Several therapeutic approaches to lessen disease severity and reduce virus shedding have been shown to diminish virus transmission. Although outside the scope of this review, social patterns and behaviour, including the use of face masks, hand hygiene and social distancing, can further limit virus exposure to uninfected populations. Understanding how to maximise the effectiveness of each approach will contribute towards decreased influenza virus infection rates during both pandemic and interpandemic times.
Vaccination
Vaccination is the primary public health strategy to prevent or reduce disease following influenza virus infection. Simulation models demonstrate that vaccination has the potential to significantly reduce the spread and severity of disease in the event of a pandemic, although these transmission dynamics might be influenced by prior host immunity to heterologous strains (Refs 127, 128 (Ref. 153) ; in addition to concerns of quantity, drug resistance and availability of paediatric formulations, the effectiveness of these formulations in reducing the transmission of new virus strains among treated individuals should be evaluated and there needs to be continued surveillance to identify any influenza virus strains that acquire resistance to available antivirals.
Postexposure oseltamivir prophylaxis of contacts of individuals with laboratory-confirmed influenza reduced the secondary spread of virus to susceptible individuals in two recent studies, demonstrating the ability of antiviral treatment to attenuate virus transmission (Refs 154, 155) . Furthermore, additional antiviral drugs need to be developed in the event that influenza viruses resistant to NA inhibitors attain increased circulation and pose a public health risk.
Interferon treatment in preclinical models
The host interferon (IFN) response has an important role in the establishment of an antiviral state that can limit virus replication following infection. Administration of exogenous IFN to engage this response prior to infection is a potential prophylactic or therapeutic strategy for influenza viruses and is used clinically for the treatment of other viral infections, including hepatitis C virus (Refs 156, 157) . Previous studies have demonstrated the ability of exogenous IFN to reduce viral titres and to reduce disease severity following influenza virus infection in several animal models, including mice, ferrets and guinea pigs (Refs 158, 159, 160 
